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Monetary policy and bank behavior: 
Empirical evidence from India 
 
Saibal GHOSH 
  
The paper develops an empirical model to explore the role that bank characteristics play 
in influencing the monetary transmission process. Employing data on Indian commercial 
banks for the period 1992-2004, the findings indicate that for banks classified according 
to size and capitalization, a monetary contraction lowers bank lending, although large 
and well-capitalized banks are able to shield their loan portfolio from monetary shocks. 
 
Introduction 
A vast literature has developed in recent years on the effectiveness of monetary policy 
and the channels through which such policy operates. This renewed interest in monetary 
transmission needs to be viewed within the context of a revival of theories that stress the impact 
of the financial system on aggregate economic activity. 
Generally speaking, banks can play different roles in the transmission process. The 
traditional money view focuses on the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets, where the 
aggregated amounts of deposits constitutes the largest part of the money supply. The central bank 
is assumed to be able to control this quantity of money on the banks’ balance sheets through 
monetary policy. It the central bank manages to diminish money supply, the real interest rate is 
expected to rise, dampening real demand. The alternative credit view assumes that there are 
imperfections in financial markets which increase the price of bank loans – the external finance 
premium – and/or lower the availability of bank credit, depending on the monetary policy stance 
(Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Taylor, 2000). The credit view considers two channels through 
which monetary policy affects the real economy. The first channel is, the balance sheet channel, 
which works through the balance sheets of potential borrowers. A monetary policy tightening, by 
increasing the interest rate, deteriorates the net worth position and credit worthiness of the private 
sector, prompting the banks to raise hurdle rates on loans, resulting in a rise in the external 
finance premium on new bank loans.  The second channel, ‘the bank lending channel’ focuses on 
the asset side of the balance sheets of banks, especially on the supply of bank credit. It assumes 
that a monetary tightening, by draining the liquidity position of banks, forces some banks to 
diminish their supply of credit.  
The principal focus of the present study is on the lending channel, and hence, on the 
reaction of loan supply to a monetary shock, particularly the differential response of certain types 
of banks. The idea behind this is that some banks are more capable than others to offset a 
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monetary policy-induced decrease in deposits (or, an increase in the cost of funding), because 
they can find non-deposit funding easily or draw on their buffer of liquid assets. 
The present paper examines this aspect within an empirical framework. In particular, we 
analyze the transmission of a monetary policy shock, namely a change in the policy interest rate, 
allowing for the presence of banks with differential characteristics in such a setup.  The rest of the 
discussion is structured as follows. The following section reviews the relevant literature in this 
area. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the empirical strategy and the results. The concluding remarks are 
contained in Section 5. 
 
II. Related Literature 
The bank-lending channel has been theoretically analyzed by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) in a model that expands the conventional IS-LM framework by taking into account the 
bank loan market. Loans and bonds are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, both for borrowers 
and banks. This implies, along with the bond rate, the bank lending rate is also introduced in the 
analysis, as it impacts loan demand and supply and the demand for output.  
In an attempt to segregate the effect of loan demand from loan supply, Kashyap, Stein 
and Wilcox (1993) examined movements in the mix between bank loans and a close substitute 
(i.e., commercial paper) for bank finance to firms, following changes in monetary policy. The 
study found evidence that tight monetary policy leads to an increase in commercial paper 
issuance, while bank loans slowly declines. Oliner and Rudebusch (1995) questioned the 
usefulness of changes in the aggregate financing mix as an indicator of the operation of the bank 
lending channel.  They instead proposed an alternative explanation: monetary tightening does not 
only reduce the demand for all types of external finance, but it also redirects all types of credit 
from small firms to large firms, which rely more heavily on commercial paper financing. Thus, 
heterogeneity in loan demand rather than shifts in loan supply would explain a change in the mix 
between bank and non-bank financing. Using data on US manufacturing sector, Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1995) found almost no evidence that a monetary shock changes the composition of 
bank and non-bank debt for either small or large firms.  
Kishan and Opiela’s (2000) paper extended the above analysis to include bank 
capitalization as an important variable. Their empirical results provided strong evidence that the 
smallest and least capitalised banks are the most responsive to monetary policy, a finding 
consistent with loan supply shifts for this category of banks.  
Studies on the lending channel have also been explored for non-US economies. Thus, 
Favero et al. (1999) empirically investigated the existence of a lending channel for four European 
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countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) and uncovered limited evidence of a lending 
channel in these countries. In the context of emerging economies, Kim (1999) observed that bank 
lending played a significant independent role in Korea in amplifying the real effects of tightened 
monetary policy, which was implemented in response to the crisis. Using data for the period 
1990-2002, Alfaro et al. (2003) detect the presence of a bank lending channel in Chile, having an 
independent and significant effect in terms of macroeconomic activity.  
 Evidence on monetary transmission mechanism for India using a vector autoregression 
framework revealed that a positive shock to broad money over time leads to higher output, while 
a shock to the call money rate produces the reverse effect (RBI, 2003). More recent evidence by 
Pandit et al. (2006) examines (a) the existence or otherwise of the bank lending channel in India, 
using quarterly data for 1997:1 to 2002:2 and (b) whether the transmission of monetary policy via 
the bank lending channel is different for big versus small banks. The findings indicate that (a) 
bank lending channel is operative in India and importantly, (b) the transmission process is 
different for big versus small banks. 
The present exercise expands on the extant literature by incorporating in addition, to bank 
size, bank capital and liquidity as relevant bank characteristic variables. Utilizing advanced panel 
data techniques, the study ensures avoidance of estimation bias and specification problems.  
 
III. Empirical Strategy and Database 
 The econometric exercise tests whether bank characteristic matters for monetary 
transmission. Accordingly, we specify a framework which incorporates the following features: 
first, output, prices and the monetary policy indicator are interacted with the relevant bank 
characteristic variable to enable banks with differing characteristics to exhibit differential 
response to macroeconomic and monetary developments. Second, dynamics are introduced by 
including lags of the dependent variable and estimating the model in lagged differences.  
Towards this end, we estimate the following specification: 
Advgrkt =f(lagged Advgrkt,GDPGRt,PRt,YLD364t,Opexpkt,BChkt*GDPGRt,  
BCh kt*PRt, BCh kt*YLDt,)                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where subscript k (cross section) is a bank indicator and t (time series) denotes year indicator. 
Among the dependent variables, we include the real GDP growth and the inflation rate. Bank 
intermediation costs, defined as the ratio of operating expense to total assets (Opexp), is explicitly 
included among the bank-specific variables, since this is likely to affect the cost of funds and with 
that, the quantum of loan advanced.  
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The primary focus of the study is on the coefficient of the monetary policy indicator and 
its interaction with the relevant bank characteristic (denoted as, BCh) variable. The monetary 
policy indicator is captured by the yield on 364-day treasury bills (YLD364). We employ the 
primary market cut-off yield as compared to secondary market yield since changes in the latter 
could be due to short-term demand-supply changes in the inter-bank market and not related to any 
fundamental shift in the monetary stance. The use of T-bill yield as a monetary policy indicator 
has gained prominence in the literature of late, both internationally (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) as 
well as in the Indian context (Prasad and Ghosh, 2005). The coefficient on this variable is 
therefore directly interpretable as the overall effect of monetary policy.  
On the other hand, the coefficient on the interaction of the bank characteristic variable 
with YLD364 can be interpreted as the indirect effect of monetary policy operating through the 
concerned bank characteristic variable. To the extent that large, liquid and well-capitalised banks 
are able to shield their loan portfolio from monetary shocks by drawing on their liquid holdings of 
securities and/or by attracting non-deposit funding, the coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be positive.  
Bank-characteristic variables are required to measure the susceptibility of a bank’s 
lending activity to changes in the monetary policy stance. The literature on the lending channel 
suggests several bank characteristic variables: 
The size of the bank. Small banks encounter more asymmetric information problems in the 
capital market than large banks and therefore, they may find it difficult to raise uninsured 
(i.e., non-deposit) funds in response to monetary tightening (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). 
The degree of liquidity. Liquid banks can draw on their reserves of cash and securities to 
protect their loan portfolio, while this is less possible for illiquid banks (Kashyap and Stein, 
2000). 
The degree of capitalization. Poorly capitalized banks have less access to non-deposit funds 
and therefore, are forced to cut back their loan supply by more than well-capitalised banks 
(Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Kishan and Opiela, 2000). 
The three bank characteristics variables are adopted in this study. The measures for size, 
liquidity and capitalization (Size, Liq and Cap) are defined as follows: 
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The natural logarithm of total assets, Ait measures bank size. Liquidity is defined as the 
ratio of liquid assets Lit (cash and balances with central bank plus call money plus investment in 
government and approved securities) to total assets. Capitalisation is given by the ratio of capital 
and reserves, Cit to total assets. These three criteria are normalized with respect to their averages 
across all banks, so that they sum to zero over all observations.1  
 
Econometric Issues 
Owing to the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable, ordinary least squares estimation 
cannot be applied, since the errors would be correlated with the regressand, resulting in biased 
estimates. The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation is widely used for dynamic 
panel data models. If there are no unobserved bank effects, we can apply the GMM technique to 
(1) by using lagged right hand side variables as instruments.  
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values are valid 
instruments in the regression procedure. A necessary condition for the validity of such 
instruments is that the error term be serially uncorrelated. To address these issues, we present two 
specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first is the Sargan test of over-
identifying restrictions, which tests for the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the 
sample analog of the moment conditions used in the estimation process. The second test examines 
the hypothesis that the error term differenced regression is not second-order serially correlated, 
which implies that the error term in the level regression is not serially correlated. The failure to 
reject the null hypotheses in both cases provides support to the model. We present only the two-
step GMM estimates, since they are more efficient than one-step estimates and additionally, the 
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions is heteroskedasticity-consistent only if based on the 
two-step estimates. 
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The Database 
The data are culled from the yearly RBI publication, Statistical Tables Relating to Banks 
in India, which provides annual data on major heads of assets and liabilities and income and 
expenditure profile of banks. The sample in the study covers the period 1992 to 2004 and covers 
50 banks, comprising 27 public sector banks, 15 old private banks and 8 foreign banks, 
accounting for, on average around 80 per cent of the total assets of the banking system over the 
sample period. In order to build a balanced panel, de novo private banks, which came into 
operation in 1996, have been excluded from the sample. This omission is of minor importance, 
since these banks accounted for, on average, around 7 per cent of the total banking sector assets 
since their existence.2  
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
It needs to be recognized that during most of the period monetary policy was loose, i.e., 
short-term interest went down. In general, it is easier for banks to expand lending when interest 
rates are low than to cut lending when monetary conditions are tight. Therefore, the presented 
evidence of the response of lending to interest rate changes may entail some sample bias, as the 
interest rate changes during the period were mostly downwards.  
The descriptive statistics of the relevant variables presented in Table 1 are consistent with 
this fact. Illustratively, the 364-day T-bill yield witnessed a marked decline over the period from 
13.12 per cent to 4.40 per cent: its high range (maximum less minimum) being perhaps indicative 
of the secular decline in interest rates over the sample period. Real GDP exhibited moderate 
fluctuation over the sample period, while prices witnessed high variability. This is in consonance 
with the widely documented which shows that prices declined from an average of 10% in the first 
half of the 1990s to about 5% in the latter half of the 1990s and even lower thereafter. 
The number of lags for the instruments was chosen on empirical grounds and set not too 
high in order to preserve as many observations as possible. The Sargan test indicates that the 
instruments are valid. The AR2 tests indicate that no second-order autocorrelation in the 
residuals. These tests, taken together, suggest that the model is well specified.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Notation Variable Mean Std. 
Devn. 
Minimum Maximum 
Macroeconomic   
GDPGR Rate of growth of real GDP  5.754 1.826 1.300 8.500
PR Annual percent change in WPI 6.972 3.321 3.270 13.840
Bank-specific   
Advgr Growth rate of real advances 7.955 1.383 3.740 11.970
Size Natural logarithm of total asset 8.803 1.403 4.743 12.919
Liquidity Cash in hand plus balances with 
RBI plus call money plus 
investment in government and 
approved securities/total asset 
0.461 0.083 0.105 0.901
Capitalisation Equity capital plus reserve/total 
asset 
0.059 0.032 0.009 0.246
Opexp Operating expenses/total asset 2.637 0.685 0.800 7.270
Monetary policy 
indicator 
  
YLD 364 Yield on 364-day T-bills 9.312 2.462 4.400 13.120
 
The columns denoted Size, Liquidity and Capitalization give the results of the estimation 
including the three different bank-characteristic variables, bank size, liquidity and capitalization, 
respectively. For comparison sake, the first column also presents the results of estimation without 
interacting with any of the bank-characteristic variables. The message emanating from the 
analysis can be summarized as follows.  
The lagged dependent variable is positive and significant at conventional levels, 
signifying that there is persistence in the dependent variable. At the macro level, real GDP 
growth and raises lending, which is suggestive of pro-cyclicality in banks’ credit extension 
behavior. At the bank-specific level, across all specifications, higher intermediation cost 
negatively affects bank lending by raising the cost of funds.  
Our primary interest is the coefficient on the interest rate variable as given by YLD364. 
The estimates reveal that, in the baseline model, the coefficient on this variable is negative and 
statistically significant, which suggests that a contractionary monetary policy leads to a decline in 
advances growth. In terms of magnitude, an increase in interest rate by 1 percentage point in the 
long run leads to a decrease in the amount of advances by nearly 0.4 per cent in the baseline 
regression. 
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Table 2: Bank Lending and Monetary Policy:  
Evidence according to Bank Characteristics 
Variable  Bank characteristic 
 Baseline model Size Liquidity Capitalisation 
 Coeff..  Std.Err Coeff.. Std. Err Coeff.. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err 
First lag of dependent variable 0.312*** 0.021 0.284*** 0.016 0.274*** 0.024 0.262*** 0.022 
Second lag of dependent variable 0.038*** 0.012 0.021* 0.012 0.016 0.017 0.008 0.016 
YLD 364 -
0.442*** 
0.197 -0.506** 0.208 -0.298 0.215 -0.504*** 0.197 
Bank characteristic*YLD364   0.173** 0.099 0.140*** 0.028 0.289*** 0.076 
GDPGR 0.008 0.135 0.506*** 0.115 -0.289** 0.132 0.009 0.136 
Bank characteristic*GDPGR   -0.646*** 0.098 0.127*** 0.028 0.451*** 0.059 
PR 0.144 0.109 0.191 0.144 0.164 0.117 0.089 0.139 
Bank characteristic*PR   -0.709*** 0.122 -0.040** 0.018 -0.076* 0.043 
Bank characteristic   0.479*** 0.039 0.516** 0.229 0.822* 0.455 
Opexp -
0.139*** 
0.012 -0.082*** 0.012 -
0.135*** 
0.014 -0.129*** 0.012 
Constant  -
1.089*** 
0.215 -7.174*** 0.543 -
1.557*** 
0.214 -1.591*** 0.267 
Diagnostics     
Time period 1992-2004 1992-2004 1992-2004 1992-2004 
Sargan test, AR2 (p-values) 0.121, 0.679 0.146, 0.729 0.144, 0.703 0.147, 0.711 
Number of banks, observations 50, 450 50, 450 50, 450 50, 450 
***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.  
 
We next turn to the columns focusing on bank characteristics.  Most of the variables are 
unaltered in sign and significance vis-à-vis the baseline specification. Focusing specifically on the 
monetary policy indicator, the coefficient on the interest rate is negative in all three cases, 
although not significant in the equation with liquidity. More specifically, the coefficient for the 
interest rate equals –0.506 in the advance equation with size and –0.504 in the equation with 
capitalization, which means that an increase in interest rate by 1 percentage point leads to a 
decline in loan growth by nearly 0.5 per cent in both cases. In the equation without the bank 
characteristic variable, the coefficient is smaller. 
Turning to the coefficients of the interaction terms, the expected positive coefficients are 
observed for across all cases. Combining with the earlier point, this indicates that in the equations 
pertaining to size and capitalization, the coefficients on the interest rate and its interaction term 
with the concerned bank characteristic variable are both significant and have the signs that are in 
consonance with the lending channel.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 The study presents empirical evidence on the lending channel in India, using annual 
bank-level data covering the period 1992-2004. The analysis focuses on the differential response 
of loan supply to monetary policy changes across bank categorized in terms of their size, 
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capitalization and liquidity. The analysis indicates that for banks classified according to size and 
capitalization, a monetary contraction lowers bank lending, although large and well-capitalized 
banks are able to shield their loan portfolio from monetary shocks.  
 Two important implications flow from the analysis. First, the analysis indicates that 
prudential regulations play an important role in influencing lending decisions of banks (Nachane 
et al., 2001; Pandit et al., 2006). More specifically, the institution of capital adequacy ratios has 
made banks more concerned with the risk-return profile of loans, since additional lending 
warrants additional capital in order to adhere to the stipulated capital adequacy norms. Second, 
the analysis indicates that bigger banks are able to protect their loan portfolio from monetary 
contraction. This assumes prominence in view of the discussion on mergers and consolidation 
presently underway in India.  
  
 
Endnotes  
The views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper reflects the personal opinion of the 
author. I would like to thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for the observations on 
an earlier draft.  
 
1. In the case of size, the normalization is not just over the sample mean over the whole 
sample period, but over the means per year as well, so that trends in bank size are 
removed. 
 
2. A major merger was witnessed in the private sector bank category in 2001, which 
significantly raised the share of de novo private banks in total banking sector assets. 
However, given that the database encompasses a time period much before their 
operations and a much smaller time span consequent to the merger, this omission would 
not affect the results significantly, since, on average, the share of de novo banks in total 
banking sector assets increased to around 8-10% over the sample period. 
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